# Consentrifuge (strawman) What would a staking setup that prioritizes faster block times look like? One way is to skip the aggregation step for the available chain. This would require increasing max EB and to leverage an Orbit mechanism to allow more stake to participate each slot while trying to retain some level of decentralization. Figure 1 provides an overview of such a mechanism. The available chain has a slot time of 6-8s and relies on a core of bigger validators. Smaller validator still participate in providing ILs as well as finalizing the chain in an Orbit-like setup. The finality gadget includes aggregation and has a longer slot time (12-24s).  **Figure 1.** Overview of a strawman proposal for achieving shorter block times. The available chain progresses at a 6-8s slot time without aggregation and the SSF finality gadget progresses at a 12-24s slot time, with a similar attestation aggregation as today. ### Available chain + FOCIL * The available chain progresses in 6-8 second block times, with no attestation aggregation step. * We increase Max EB to around 65536 such that enough weight can be assigned to each block of the available chain without relying on aggregation. Refer to Figure 2 for an upper bound on attesting stake in a committee under a Zipfian distribution of stakers with varying Max EB. * Individual consolidation incentives ensures that the largest validators wish to attest to the available chain and that the smallest wish to only provide ILs. * There is a reasonable minimum balance for selection to the Orbit mechanism to attest to the available chain (at around 32-256 ETH). Validators just around the minimum balance do however not have very strong incentives to elect to attest, and will just earn slightly less by just focusing on providing ILs. Validators with a balance higher than the minimum can still opt out. The minimum for providing ILs is much lower (at around 0.1-1). * There is further an Orbit/Vorbit mechanism in place to ensure big validators attest with higher probability than what is implied by their stake alone. The committee rotates slowly. * Beacon proposers are selected among the attesters based on stake. * The probability to be selected to the IL committee is higher for all validators that have opted out of attesting to the available chain, and an exclusive choice between the two roles could theoretically be used.  **Figure 2.** Upper bound on attesting stake for the available chain in a committee under a Zipfian distribution of stakers. As evident, increasing max EB has a positive effect up until some point (65536-131072 ETH) where the number of validators that hold the maximum balance under a Zipfian distribution becomes very low anyway. ### Finality gadget * All validators with a balance higher than some minimum (at around 1-32 ETH) participate in finalizing the chain. * The finality gadget finalizes checkpoints (e.g., every other block+slot) at a 12-24 second interval and votes are aggregated so that more validators can participate each round. * The Vorbit SSF design with circular finality could be utilized, or Orbit SSF. ### Conclusion The Centrifuge design is one strawman we can can consider for a future staking implementation. Bigger validators propose blocks and attest to the available chain, where the benefits of fast slot times are the greatest.