# Retroactive proposer rewards The goal is to incentivize timely block releasing, i.e. beginning of slot. Currently the block proposer is rewarded in proportion to the profitability of the attestations they include in their block. Instead let's try to also account for the proposer's timeliness using some heuristic. Heuristic could be to scale the proposer's reward by the **share of same-slot committee votes that the block receives and are included in the subsequent block.** Consider the following example:  Block `n+1` was released slightly late such that 10% of the committee in slot `n+1` are attesting before they received block `n+1` and thus vote for block `n`. However, the great majority of the committee (90%) hears block `n+1` before they attest and so they vote for it. The block proposer of slot `n+2` includes all attestations in their block `n+2`. The idea now is that the rewards of the block proposer of slot `n+1` are scaled with a factor of `0.9`. This punishes the proposer for being slightly late such that 10% of the committee didn't hear the block in time. Note that all committee members are incentivized to vote for block `n+1` (if they hear it in time) and therefore griefing the proposer of block `n+1` is costly and not incentive compatible. Further note that it is not incentive-compatible for the proposer of block `n+2` to grief the attesters of of slot `n+1` by not including attestations, since they also get paid based on those. If attestations are missing altogether, one could potentially simply treat them in favor of the block proposer in question. It's not the proposers fault if validators don't attest at all.